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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals in an order dated 
December 7, 2007, and then issued an order dated June 27, 2008, returning jurisdiction to 
this Court. (Supplemental Addendum ("Supp. Add.") at 1.) 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES' STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
Bank One's statement of facts misstates or omits several keys facts.1 The most 
significant misstatements or omissions are: 
In paragraphs 7 and 10, Bank One claims that the Lightner Letter was intended for 
Lincoln Partners. However, the letter was addressed to "Whom it May Concern," was 
not located in Lincoln Partners' files, and was created at exactly the time when Bodell 
Construction was reconsidering whether to loan the funds to Jenson and Robbins. (R. at 
4078, 4086-87.) 
In paragraph 8, Bank One claims that "Robbins believed that Arimex was willing 
and able to make the Arimex Loan to MadTrax as described in the Lightner letter." 
However, Robbins could not have truly believed this. The President of Robbins's 
company testified that the meeting with Arimex was "crazy." (R. at 4081.) The CFO 
testified that MadTrax did not want to be involved with Arimex and that he told Robbins 
he didn't think the deal was "real." Moreover, the supposed agreement with Arimex, 
which has never been authenticated, contained a number of conditions that MadTrax did 
not and could not satisfy. (R. at 4082-83.) 
For a detailed recitation of the facts, Bodell Construction refers this Court to its 
summary judgment briefing at R. 4042-4095. 
1 
In paragraph 16, Bank One claims that it knew nothing about Bodell 
Construction's loan. However, the evidence is overwhelming that Lightner, a Bank One 
employee whose knowledge is attributable to Bank One, knew that the letter would be 
used to persuade investors to invest in Robbins's companies. {See R. at 4071-77.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellees do not dispute three determinative facts: (1) the Appellees are non-
parties to the Settlement Agreement; (2) the text of the Settlement Agreement repeatedly 
characterizes itself as a release; and (3) the Settlement Agreement repeatedly indicates 
that it applies only to the parties to the agreement. These facts, all derived from the "four 
corners" of the Settlement Agreement itself, show that the district court's interpretation 
of the Settlement Agreement, which is given no deference by this Court, was incorrect. 
Based on these facts, this Court should resolve the primary issue in this appeal, and 
reverse the district court, by finding that: (1) the Settlement Agreement is a release, and 
(2) it does not specifically release claims against Appellees as required by the Liability 
Reform Act. 
The District Court's judgment should also be reversed even if this Court 
determines that the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction. Appellees have 
not cited any authority to support their claim that accord and satisfaction bars "all claims 
arising from the subject matter of the dispute" and controlling Utah law holds the 
contrary. Accord and satisfaction is a contractual doctrine that, like r&\\ contracts, is 
governed by the intent of the parties. Accordingly, unless the parties express an intent to 
release specific claims, an accord and satisfaction does not discharge those claims. The 
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Settlement Agreement makes it clear that the parties did not intend to release claims 
against non-parties to the agreement. Thus, even if the Settlement Agreement is 
construed to be an accord and satisfaction, it does not resolve claims (especially tort 
claims) against Robbins or Bank One, who were not parties to the Settlement Agreement. 
At the very least, there are disputed issues of material fact regarding the intended 
meaning of the Settlement Agreement that make summary judgment inappropriate and 
require a trial. 
The trial court's ruling flies in the face of clear statutory law regarding settlement 
and, if not reversed, could upset the clear expectations of a number of settling parties 
throughout the State. The Liability Reform Act clearly provides that non-parties to a 
settlement are not released unless the agreement expresses a clear intent to do so. 
Although Appellees claim that the Liability Reform Act does not apply here, that 
argument is incorrect. The Liability Reform Act clearly applies to releases like the 
Settlement Agreement and should apply to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
Therefore, and as addressed more fully below, the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment must be reversed for this reason as well. 
The District Court's ruling excluding Bodell Construction's damages theory, 
which is ripe for review by this Court, must also be reversed. The District Court abused 
its discretion when it struck portions of Bodell Construction's expert report on damages 
because Bodell Construction had not violated any rule or court order and had complied 
with its disclosure obligations. Even if this Court finds that Bodell Construction did not 
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fully comply with its disclosure obligations, there was good cause for Bodell 
Construction's practice and Appellees were not prejudiced. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS A RELEASE AND DOES NOT 
DISCHARGE CLAIMS AGAINST BANK ONE OR ROBBINS 
A. The "Four Corners" of the Settlement Agreement Clearly Show that It 
Is a Release 
The Settlement Agreement repeatedly characterizes itself as a release and indicates 
that it is limited to the parties to the agreement. (See Bodell Construction's Opening Br. 
13-16.) As addressed in more detail there, the relevant provisions of the Settlement 
Agreement repeatedly use the term "release" and never mention a supposed "accord and 
satisfaction." These clear expressions regarding the intended meaning of the Settlement 
Agreement are controlling and should resolve the question of whether the Settlement 
Agreement is a release or an accord and satisfaction. 
Ignoring the numerous provisions of the Settlement Agreement that describe the 
document as a release, Bank One argues that "[t]he language of the Settlement 
Agreement... clearly demonstrates an accord and satisfaction because without an accord 
and satisfaction several paragraphs in the Settlement Agreement would be redundant." 
(Bank One Br. 19.) However, Bank One's argument relies exclusively on Paragraph 2 of 
the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, Bank One claims that subparagraph (a) is a 
The controlling cases cited by Bodell Construction in its opening brief all stand for the 
proposition that the intent of the parties is controlling when evaluating a potential accord 
and satisfaction. See Bodell Construction's Opening Brief ("Bodell Br.") at 20-22. 
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release but subparagraph (b) is an accord and satisfaction. (Id.)3 Bank One's argument is 
incorrect for at least three reasons. First, Paragraph 2 clearly indicates that both 
subparagraph (a) and (b) are intended to be releases. The final phrase of Paragraph 2, 
which follows subparagraphs (a) and (b), states that "such releases shall not apply to any 
obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement." (Emphasis added.) Had 
subparagraph (b) been intended to create an accord and satisfaction, the Settlement 
Agreement would have described it as such or at least used the singular term "release" 
rather than the plural term "releases." The fact that both subparagraph (a) and (b) were 
described as releases shows that subparagraph (b) was not intended to be an accord and 
Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement provides as follows: 
Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell Construction Company], for himself, 
itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities claiming by, through or 
under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever 
discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective members, managers, 
officers, employees and agents (each, including without limitation 
Jenson, an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, 
charges, demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, 
causes of action, or suits at law and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, 
expenses, costs and attorney fees, whether known or unknown, suspected or 
unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "C/azm"), arising out of all 
past affiliations and transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party, 
including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related arrangements and 
transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 
acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in 
connection with the Loans, including all principal and interest that may 
have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully 
satisfied and repaid in full; provided that such releases shall not apply to 
any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement to be 
performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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satisfaction. Second, Bank One's argument is founded on the mistaken assumption that 
"[o]bviously, Parts (a) and (b) were intended to accomplish two different things." (Bank 
One Br. 19.) However, this conclusion is not obvious and Bank One cites no evidence to 
support it. Attorneys drafting a release on behalf of a settling party often include 
redundant language to insure that all bases are covered. Given that both subparagraphs 
(a) and (b) are explicitly described as releases, the explanation that the two subparagraphs 
were included in an abundance of caution is more consistent with the expressed intent of 
the parties.5 Third, in making this argument Bank One fails to cite key language in 
subparagraph (b) that explicitly indicates that only "the obligations of the MSF Parties in 
connection with the Loans" are deemed to have been paid in full. The implication of this 
language is that the obligations of individuals or entities other than the MSF Parties (as 
well as tort claims) are not released. This language reaffirms that even subparagraph (b) 
4
 It is telling that both Appellees failed to address this fact even though Bodell raised it in 
its opening brief. {See Bodell Br. at 15-16.) 
5
 Bank One contends that this is the only way to reconcile these provisions and quotes 
LDSHosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) for the proposition 
that "a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its 
terms, which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." (Bank One Br. 19-
20.) However, that case is distinguishable because it involved a form insurance contract, 
which made it reasonable to believe that each provision had been carefully crafted. The 
fact that the document was not negotiated also made the intent of the parties less 
important. In addition, Bank One omits the sentence that immediately precedes the 
sentence quoted above, which reads: U[A] cardinal rule in construing the contract is to 
give effect to the intentions of the parties and, if possible, these intentions should be 
gleaned from an examination of the text of the contract itself." LDS Hosp., 765 P.2d at 
858. Here, the language of the Settlement Agreement repeatedly indicates that the 
agreement is a release limited to the parties to the agreement and those intentions should 
be given effect. 
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is limited to MSF and does not benefit Appellees. Thus, the Settlement Agreement is 
limited by its own terms to the "obligations of the MSF Parties." 
Because the Settlement Agreement is a release, the Liability Reform Act governs 
its application to parties not named in it.6 The Liability Reform Act provides as follows: 
"A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not 
discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides'' Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
42 (2002) (emphasis added). This Court has interpreted the emphasized language to 
mean that "a release must contain language either naming the defendant or identifying the 
defendant with some degree of specificity in order to discharge that defendant from 
liability." Child v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah 1995). 
In Child, the plaintiff signed a release releasing a third party, "'together with all 
other persons, firms and corporations/ from all liability arising from the accident." Id. at 
10. The phrase "all other persons, firms and corporations" was found by this Court as 
lacking the requisite specificity for the defendant to have been discharged from liability 
under that release. Id. at 11-12. On this basis, this Court reversed the trial court's entry 
of summary judgment in the defendant's favor. Id. at 12. 
Accordingly, for Appellees to be released by the Settlement Agreement, that 
agreement must identify them by name or "with some degree of specificity." The 
Settlement Agreement not only does not mention the Appellees with specificity, it does 
not mention them at all. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement includes no language akin 
6
 Even if the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction, the Liability Reform 
Act should still apply as discussed in great detail in Section I.D.2 below. 
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to that in Child that might even arguably apply to Appellees. Thus, pursuant to the 
Liability Reform Act, the release of Jenson and MSF from claims by Bodell and Bodell 
Construction does not release Appellees from liability for tort claims. 
Bank One asserts that "Bodell confuses the doctrines of accord and satisfaction 
with release and misconstrues Bank One's argument as relying on the release contained 
in the Settlement Agreement, when in fact Bank One relies on the accord and satisfaction 
contained in the Settlement Agreement." (Bank One Br. 21.) This argument begs the 
question because whether the Settlement Agreement constitutes an accord and 
satisfaction is a question of intent. As discussed above, the language contained within the 
four comers of the Settlement Agreement indicates that the parties intended the document 
to be a release, not an accord and satisfaction. In addition, as addressed in Section I.D.I 
below, even if the Settlement Agreement is considered an accord and satisfaction, the 
scope of the agreement is still a question of intent and the doctrine does not "resolve all 
claims arising from the subject matter of the dispute" as Appellees contend. 
B. The Settlement Agreement Is Not an Accord and Satisfaction 
Even though the Settlement Agreement repeatedly characterizes its provisions as 
releases and never uses the term accord and satisfaction, Appellees spend a considerable 
Bank One appears to concede that the Liability Reform Act is controlling if the 
Settlement Agreement is a release. (Ban!: One Br. 25.) Although Robbins does not 
directly assert that the Liability Reform Act does not apply to the Settlement Agreement 
if it is construed as a release, Robbins's string cites suggest this possibility. (Robbins Br. 
20.) To the extent that argument is implied, it is incorrect. The Liability Reform Act 
applies to the Settlement Agreement as it relates to Robbins because Robbins is a 
"regular co-defendant." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42,1f 11, 48 P.3d 91. 
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portion of their briefs arguing that the Settlement Agreement is actually an accord and 
satisfaction because the legal elements of accord and satisfaction are satisfied. 
In essence, Appellees argue that the parties to the Settlement Agreement 
unwittingly created an accord and satisfaction that, through mechanical operation of law, 
eliminated all claims — both tort and contract — that relate in any way to the original 
loan to MSF. Missing from Appellees5 arguments is any discussion of the intent of the 
parties. The reason is clear - focusing on intent, as the controlling case law demands, is 
fatal to Appellees' appeal because the trial court granted summary judgment based on the 
four corners of the Settlement Agreement alone, which is devoid of any indication that 
the agreement was intended to benefit third parties. At a minimum, determining the< 
intent of the parties is a disputed issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. 
C. There is a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact Regarding the Intent of 
the Parties to the Settlement Agreement 
Even if this Court does not conclude that the Settlement Agreement is a release 
limited to the parties to the Settlement Agreement, it must conclude that there is at least a 
disputed issue of material fact regarding the intended meaning of the Settlement 
Agreement. As Bodell Construction stated in its opening brief, Bodell Construction 
The legal elements of accord and satisfaction are "(T) a bona fide dispute over an 
unliquidated amount; (ii) a payment tendered in full settlement of the entire dispute; and 
(iii) an acceptance of the payment." Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. 
v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992). These elements are 
not satisfied for the reasons set forth in Bodell's opening brief in Section LA. However, 
no additional discussion of this issue is included here because even if the legal elements 
of an accord and satisfaction were met, the scope of the accord is governed by the intent 
of the parties and the Settlement Agreement is clear that it was limited to claims against 
Jenson and MSF as discussed in Section I.D.l. 
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introduced evidence that clearly creates a dispute of material fact regarding the meaning 
of the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, Bodell Construction referenced the Affidavit 
of Michael Bodell, President of Bodell Construction, which provided that "[i]n 
negotiating the settlement and signing the Settlement Agreement, Bodell Construction 
did not intend to release any claims it had against Bank One." (Bodell Br. 19-20.) This 
testimony was confirmed by Mr. Bodell during his deposition. These statements create a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the intended meaning of the Settlement 
Agreement, which alone mandates that this Court reverse the District Court's ruling. 
Because this point is indisputable, neither Bank One nor Robbins even attempted to 
respond to this argument in its responsive brief. 
Although neither Appellee addressed the fact that there are genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the intended meaning of the Settlement Agreement, Bank One 
does argue that "[b]ecause of the clarity of the Settlement Agreement, extrinsic evidence 
need not and should [not] be considered." (Bank One Br. 20 (citing Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)); see also Robbins Br. 19.) Bamk One's argument 
is incorrect because the Settlement Agreement cannot be considered to clearly create an 
accord and satisfaction when the term is never used but the term "release" is used 
repeatedly. The parol evidence rule 'operates, in the absence of fraud or other 
invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations, 
representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of 
an integrated contract.' Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, Tf 11, 182 P.3d 
326 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Bodell's interpretation of the 
10 
language of the Settlement Agreement is entirely consistent with the plain language of 
the agreement and does not seek to vary or add any terms. 
Bank One argues in the alternative that if extrinsic evidence is considered, it 
supports the interpretation advanced by Appellees. (Bank One Br. 20-21.) In making 
this argument, Bank One does not address Mr. BodelPs statements regarding his intent in 
negotiating the Settlement Agreement or his understanding of it. Rather, Bank One 
focuses on statements recently made by Jenson in a plea agreement to resolve securities 
fraud charges against him. In that plea agreement, Jenson states that "Bodell signed an 
accord and satisfaction in which he waived all of his claims against Mr. Jenson and MSF 
Properties." {Id. at 20.) This evidence, which was never part of the record below and 
should not be considered on appeal, is of little weight for several reasons. First, Jenson5 s 
statements were made several years after the Settlement Agreement was negotiated, are 
self-serving, and do not reflect Bodell Construction's understanding of the agreement. 
Given Jenson's use of the term "accord and satisfaction" in his plea agreement - a term 
likely included by his lawyers because of these proceedings - one wonders why that term 
was not used in the Settlement Agreement if that is truly what Jenson intended at the time 
the agreement was negotiated. Second, Jenson's statements in his plea agreement do not 
resolve the intended meaning of the Settlement Agreement. At best, these statements 
create a disputed issue of material fact regarding the meaning of the Settlement 
Agreement because the parties to the agreement (Jenson and Bodell) appear to disagree 
regarding the intended meaning of its terms. 
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Bank One also points to another provision of Jenson's plea agreement in which he 
agrees to provide additional consideration to Bodell, which Bodell confirms "will be 
satisfactory to him as full restitution" as supposed support for its argument that the 
agreement is an accord and satisfaction. (Bank One Br. 21.) However, the fact that 
Jenson agreed to make additional payments to Bodell Construction pursuant to his plea 
agreement shows that the Settlement Agreement was not intended to preclude claims 
against third parties because both parties understood that Bodell Construction was not 
being fully compensated for its damages through the Settlement Agreement. Although 
Bodell Construction agreed in the Settlement Agreement that it would not bring any 
additional claims against Jenson or MSF, the fact that it had not been fully compensated 
made it clear that Bodell Construction might seek recovery from third parties who were 
liable for those damages. 
Because there are at least disputed issues of material fact regarding the intended 
meaning of the Settlement Agreement, the District Court's order granting summary 
judgment must be reversed on this ground alone. 
D. Even if the Settlement Agreement Is an Accord and Satisfaction, It 
Does Not Bar Tort Claims Against Non-Parties to the Agreement 
1. The Scope and Effect of an Accord and Satisfaction Is Determined 
by the Intent of the Parties 
Contrary to Appellees' assertions, even if the Court were to find that the 
Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction, the agreement does not discharge all 
claims arising from the underlying obligation. Given that "a single contract may embody 
a multitude of claims/' this Court has recognized that '"an accord and satisfaction may 
12 
discharge an entire contract or only a portion thereof if the contract gives rise to several 
and distinct obligations or liabilities.'" S&G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 
P.2d 735, 739 (Utah 1996) (quoting Quealy v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 668 (Utah 1986)); 
see also Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel & 
Tel Co., 844 P.2d 322, 328 (Utah 1992). This Court has explained its reasoning for this 
rule as follows: 
This proposition follows from the policy rationale underlying 
the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, which is to encourage 
the settlement of claims. If parties were required to settle all 
claims extant in a given dispute in order to have any 
settlement at all, the policy of encouraging settlement would 
be undermined. 
&£G,913P.2dat735. 
Despite this controlling authority on the issue, Appellees attempt to expand the 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction well beyond the limits of any prior application of the 
doctrine. Robbins claims: "[T]he effect of an accord and satisfaction is to fully resolve 
all claims arising from the subject matter of the dispute." (Robbins Br. 14.)9 Bank One 
claims that "[t]he Settlement Agreement was an accord and satisfaction that satisfied and 
extinguished all claims of Bodell Construction related to the Bodell Loan, including the 
9
 Robbins repeats a similar argument elsewhere in his brief. Specifically, Robbins 
argues that because the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction, the 
Promissory Note and Guaranty are "deemed satisfied and repaid in full" as to MSF and 
Jenson. (Robbins Br. 15.) He argues that Bodell Construction's damages are based on 
the damages it would have been paid pursuant to the Loan Agreement and that the 
Settlement Agreement "resolves all claims arising from the Promissory Note and 
Guaranty as to Jenson and all others, including Robbins." {Id. at 15-16.) Robbins cites 
no authority for this proposition. As stated below, the cases cited only hold that a 
contract claim is barred. The fact that Bodell Construction's tort damages are based on 
13 
claims against Bank One. (Bank One Br. 2; see also 21, 23-25.) The application of 
accord and satisfaction in the manner proposed by Appellees is contradicted by well-
settled Utah law. 
Controlling case law cited by Bodell Construction in its opening brief holds that 
the intent of the parties governs the reach of an accord and satisfaction. In Messick v. 
PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1980), this Court stated that "[t]o 
effect an accord and satisfaction, payment must result from declarations of such a clear 
nature as to assure that the parties are aware of the extent and scope of such agreement." 
Id. at 1277. In other words, the intent of the parties must be clear—parties cannot 
unwittingly create an accord and satisfaction or release third parties. In Killian v. 
Oberhansly, 743 P.2d 1200 (Utah 1987), this Court again looked to the intent of the 
parties in settling a dispute to determine the scope of an accord and satisfaction. Id. at 
1201. 
Bodell Construction cited these cases for the proposition that "[a]bsent a clear 
intent to release Appellees, Utah case law is clear that a non-party cannot benefit from an 
accord and satisfaction." (Bodell Br. 21.) However, in their unsuccessful efforts to 
distinguish these controlling cases, Appellees ignore the focus on the intent of the parties 
and simply assert that these cases do not stand for the proposition that a third party cannot 
benefit from an accord and satisfaction. (Robbins Br. 16; Bank One Br. 23.) Of course, 
Bodell Construction did not cite the cases for the proposition that an accord and 
satisfaction could never benefit a third party. Rather, Bodell Construction cited the cases 
the provisions of a contract does not alter that conclusion. 
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for the proposition that an accord and satisfaction cannot benefit a third party (like 
Appellees) absent a clear intent to do so, a principle that the cases clearly support. 
In addition to those cases, other cases make it clear that an accord and satisfaction 
need not dispose of all claims relating to the underlying obligation. In Utah, non-parties 
to a contract cannot benefit from the contract absent evidence the non-parties were 
intended to benefit. See, e.g., Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, \ 36 ("A third party may 
claim a contract benefit only if the parties to the contract clearly express an intention to 
confer a separate and distinct benefit on the third party." (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Because "it is well established that general principals of contract law 
govern accord and satisfaction," Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 326, it necessarily follows 
that non-parties to an accord and satisfaction cannot benefit from it without showing that 
the accord and satisfaction intended to benefit them. Because Appellees were neither 
parties to the Settlement Agreement, mentioned in it, nor intended in any way to benefit 
from it, the Settlement Agreement did not extinguish Bodell Construction's claims 
against Appellees. 
The only support Appellees cite for their assertion that an accord and satisfaction 
bars all claims arising from an underlying dispute is a case from the Appellate Court of 
Illinois, which is inapposite.10 Koules v. Euro-American Arbitrage, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 411 
10
 Robbins also claims that the case of Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 
804 (Minn. 1977), which was cited by Bodell Construction in its opening brief, actually 
supports Appellees. (Robbins Br. 18-19.) However, that is not correct. As even Robbins 
concedes, Luxenberg held that, under Minnesota law, a settlement agreement may 
discharge joint tortfeasors "if the settlement agreement manifests such intent." {Id. at 
18.) Thus, the case clearly supports Bodell Construction's argument that this Court must 
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(111. App. Ct. 1998), involved an employee's claim against his employer for part of his 
guaranteed salary. Id. at 412. The claim arose from a "letter agreement" between the 
parties that the court found "contained elements of both an accord and satisfaction and a 
release," both of which the court found to be valid. Id. at 414, 416, 417. Upon 
considering the employee's only claim arising from the agreement—whether the 
agreement barred the employee's cause of action against the employer—the court 
explained that "[e]ither the accord and satisfaction alone or the release alone would have 
operated to bar plaintiffs suit with respect to his guaranteed salary claim." Id. at 417. 
The court did not consider whether the accord and satisfaction or the release barred any 
other claims because there were no other claims to consider. Thus, Koules does not 
address, let alone support, the proposition that an accord and satisfaction "folly resolve[s] 
all claims arising from the subject matter of the dispute." (Robbins Br. 14.) 
Both Appellees also seek to expand the doctrine of accord and satisfaction by 
arguing that "an accord and satisfaction is a contractual method of discharging a debtor 
claim by some performance other than that which was originally due." (Robbins Br. 14 
(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Bank One Br. 21.) However, the cases 
cited by Appellees stand for the unremarkable proposition that performance of once 
look to the intent of the parties when determining the scope and effect of the Settlement 
Agreement. The court then stated that it must consider not only the intent of the parties, 
but whether the injured party had "in fact received foil compensation for his injury" and 
had not compromised the amount due. Luxenburg, 257 N.W. 2d at 807-08. In this case it 
is undisputed that Bodell Construction did not in fact receive foil compensation for its 
damages. 
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contract may be replaced by another agreed-upon obligation. They do not even suggest 
that considering one party's obligations satisfied under a contract prevents the injured 
party from seeking redress for fraud committed by other parties. Although Appellees 
attempt to construe these cases to support the argument that accord and satisfaction 
resolves an entire dispute, the cases hold no such thing. Applied to the facts here, the 
cases merely provide that Bodell Construction may not bring a claim against MSF or 
Jenson for breach of the original loan agreement. Bodell Construction has never 
attempted to do so. Rather, Bodell Construction sued non-parties to the loan agreement 
on various tort theories. 
Finally, Robbins argues that the claims against Appellees are extinguished by the 
Settlement Agreement because there can be only one satisfaction of a debt or obligation. 
(Robbins Br. 21.) While Bodell Construction agrees that a party is not entitled to a 
double recovery, it is indisputable that Bodell Construction, in fact, has not been fully 
compensated for its loss. Jenson and MSF Properties paid only $3 million to Bodell 
Construction even though Bodell Construction loaned Jenson and MSF Properties $5 
million total (and Bodell Construction is also entitled to interest). Accordingly, there is a 
factual basis for Bodell Construction's claims. 
The factual basis for Bodell Construction's claims is not eliminated just because a 
proper measure of damages for fraud inducement is the benefit of the bargain into which 
11
 Appellees cite the following cases: ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4,120, 998 
P.2d 254; Doyle's Const & Remodeling, Inc. v. Wendy's Int% Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 969, 
976 (N.D. 111. 2001); Thompson v. Nicholson, No. 30A01-9307-CH-00261, 1994 WL 
44428, at * 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1994). 
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the Plaintiff entered, as Robbins appears to contend. {See Robbins Br. 21-22.) Again, 
Robbins cites no authority for this proposition. Moreover, Robbins's argument that 
Bodell Construction's damages are based solely on the contract is inconsistent with his 
argument in other portions of the brief that Bodell Construction is only seeking the 
statutory rate of interest (rather than the contractual rate). Accordingly, this argument 
should be rejected by the Court for this reason as well. 
2. The Liability Reform Act Should Apply to an Accord and 
Satisfaction To Require that a Third-Party Be Identified in Order to 
Benefit from the Agreement 
In the event the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is an accord and 
satisfaction, the Liability Reform Act should still apply and Appellees5 liabilities with 
respect to the loan should not be discharged. The Liability Reform Act "was designed to 
retain the liability of tort-feasors and reverse the common law rule so that release of one 
joint tort-feasor did not automatically release all tort-feasors." Child v. Newsom, 892 
P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1995). Though the Liability Reform Act applies explicitly to a release, 
it should apply to an accord and satisfaction as well. Under the comraon law: "an accord 
and satisfaction between a person injured and one of several co-tortfeasors responsible 
for the injury will discharge the other tortfeasors from further liability to the person 
injured." Am. Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, § 11 (2005). 
Given this language, it would be contrary to the intent of the Liability Reform Act 
for this Court to find that the Act applies only to a release and not an accord and 
satisfaction. Moreover, such a finding could create a "bizarre" or "absurd" result. See 
Thornock v. Jensen, 950 P.2d 441, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (examining the term 
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"defendant" as used in the Liability Reform Act and concluding that defendant's 
interpretation, which would have discharged her from liability, works an "absurd" and 
"bizarre" result because it is "in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the 
statute" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The Liability Reform Act 
should therefore apply to the Settlement Agreement, even if characterized as an accord 
and satisfaction, and prevent Appellees from escaping liability for Bodell Construction's 
injury because they are not specifically mentioned and released. 
Bank One repeatedly argues that the fact that the Settlement Agreement does not 
expressly reserve claims against non-parties shows that those claims were waived. (See 
Bank One Br. 20.) However, given the clear requirements of the Liability Reform Act, 
settling parties would not expect to be required to expressly reserve claims against third 
parties. It would be patently unfair to impose that requirement on Bodell Construction in 
this case, and would upset the settled expectations of many litigants throughout Utah. 
II. This Court Should Not Consider Alternative Grounds for Affirming 
Summary Judgment 
Utah appellate courts "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable 
on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^  
13, 52 P.3d 1158 (citation, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). Bank One 
contends that summary judgment should be affirmed on another ground argued by Bank 
One in its motions for summary judgment. (Bank One Br. 26-28.) "The goal of the 
'affirm on any ground' rule is judicial economy." Okelberry v. W. Daniels Land Ass 'n, 
2005 UT App 327, f 11, 120 P.3d 34; see also Bailey, 2002 UT 58,113 n.3. Although 
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Bank One argues that this is a "textbook example" of a case where the "affirm on any 
ground" doctrine should be used (Bank One Br. 28), it would not be in the interests of 
judicial economy for this Court to consider the other arguments raised in Appellees' 
summary judgment motions. Bank One has attached the briefing of Bank One's motions 
to its brief in this case.12 As the Court will note, Addendum 2 of Bank One's brief is in 
excess of two hundred pages. Where the District Court is intimately familiar with the 
detailed arguments made by the parties in their briefs and actually heard oral argument on 
the full summary judgment motion, it would be significantly more efficient for the 
District Court to consider the alternative bases for summary judgment rather than ask all 
five members of this Court to duplicate much of the work the District Court has already 
done. However, if this Court elects to consider those arguments, Bodell Construction 
requests that this Court deny the motions for the reasons provided in Bodell 
Construction's briefing on Bank One's and Robbins's summary judgment motions. 
III. The District Court Erred in Striking the Damages Report of Bodell 
Construction's Damages Expert 
The District Court abused its discretion when it struck the expert report of Bodell 
Construction's damages expert, Merrill Weight, (the "Weight Report") because Bodell 
Construction did not violate a court order or rule of civil procedure. Even if this Court 
were to conclude that Bodell Construction violated a rule of civil procedure, any violation 
was harmless and did not warrant the harsh sanction imposed. 
However, Bank One does not include the briefing relating to Robbins's motions, 
which consists of almost nine hundred additional pages. 
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A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because Bodell Construction 
Did Not Violate any Court Order or any Rule of Civil Procedure 
Appellees do not dispute that in order to be sanctioned, Bodell Construction must 
have violated a court order or rule of civil procedure. It is undisputed that throughout 
discovery Bodell Construction repeatedly indicated that it was seeking damages on the $4 
million loan it had made, plus interest "at the legal rate." (R. at 2876-78.) Moreover, in 
response to a specific request for admission from Bank One, Bodell Construction 
clarified more than three years before the scheduled trial in this matter that it interpreted 
the legal rate to mean "the rate provided in Utah Code §§ 15-1-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of 
court." (R. at 2962.) 
Section 15-1-1(1) provides that "[t]he parties to a lawful contract may agree upon 
any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action 
that is the subject of their contract." Accordingly, by disclosing that Bodell Construction 
intended to seek interest allowable under 15-1-1, which allows parties to recover at the 
contract rate, Bodell Construction disclosed that its damages could include interest at the 
contractual rate. 
Although it is undisputed that Bodell Construction repeatedly disclosed that it 
intended to seek interest at the "legal rate," Bank One unjustifiably leaps to the 
conclusion that Bodell Construction repeatedly said it would seek damages at the 
"statutory rate." (Bank One Br. 34.) However, Bodell Construction never used that term 
and the specific code provision referenced by Bodell Construction in its discovery 
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responses specifically provided that the legal rate could be either the statutory rate or the 
rate agreed upon by the parties. See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(1), (2). 
Appellees do not dispute that Section 15-1-1 provides that the "legal rate" can be 
either a statutory rate or the rate agreed upon by the parties. Rather, Appellees argue that 
the contractual rate of interest or benefit of the bargain is not the proper measure of 
damages. Specifically, Robbins argues that the contractual rate cannot be recovered from 
a non-party to the agreement. (Robbins Br. 27-28.) Bank One argues that the benefit of 
the bargain theory is not appropriate in the case of a loan transaction. (Bank One Br. 34-
35.)14 However, these arguments are misplaced because the trial court did not strike the 
report on the ground that the damages theories contained in it were legally improper. 
Rather, the trial court struck the report on the ground that the theory had not been 
adequately disclosed. Because the theories were, in fact, disclosed, there was no 
violation of a court order or the rules and it was an abuse of discretion to strike the report. 
B. There Was Good Cause for any Violation by Bodell Construction 
Bodell Construction's actions in this matter were customary: Bodell Construction 
disclosed its damages theories during fact discovery and then laid them out in greater 
Robbins's argument is based on cases from other jurisdictions that were never cited to 
or considered by the district court. (Robbins Br. 28.) Robbins admits that "Utah law 
appears to have never specifically addressed the issue" (id.), and the cases cited by 
Robbins are not binding. Moreover, given that the district court did not strike Bodell 
Construction's expert report based on the ground that its calculations were legally 
impermissible, the argument should not be considered by this Court. 
14
 Bank One claims that the proposed damages theories "contradict recognized Utah law 
and refer to the briefing below. (Bank One Br. 41.) In fact, Utah law is that a victim of 
fraud is entitled to the benefit of the bargain. See Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 
(Utah 1974). This issue is discussed more fully in Bodell Construction's brief included 
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detail in an expert report produced during the expert discovery period. Robbins argues 
that operating in a well-accepted manner is "not the test of whether it comports with 
law." (Robbins Br. 29.) However, a violation of the rules may be excused for good 
cause and operating consistent with well-accepted litigation practices can certainly 
establish good cause. 
"District courts usually find that the exclusion of otherwise admissible testimony 
for failure to meet a timing requirement is an extreme measure to be avoided where 
possible." Seymour v. Consol Freightways, 187 F.R.D. 541, 542 (S.D. Miss. 1999). The 
district court's ruling in this case was an extreme measure given that Bodell complied 
with generally accepted litigation practices. Accordingly, the ruling should be reversed. 
C. Any Violation by Bodell Construction Was Harmless 
It is undisputed that Bodell Construction produced its damages report more than 
four months before the scheduled trial in this matter and in accordance with the 
scheduling order, that Merrill Weight was both an expert and the fact witness most 
knowledgeable about the facts relating to his damages theories, and that Bodell 
Construction agreed to allow Appellees to inquire into any factual issues relevant to his 
expert report during his expert deposition. Under these facts, Appellees would not be 
prejudiced if the report had not been stricken. 
Appellees argue that they would be prejudiced because they would have to 
conduct significant fact discovery regarding the benefit of the bargain theory and 
modified benefit of the bargain theory contained in the Weight Report. However, 
in Appendix 3 to Bank One's Brief at pages 5-10. 
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Appellees dramatically overstate the amount of additional discovery required. The 
benefit of the bargain theory included in the Weight Report was based solely on the 
interest rate included in the loan agreement between MSF and Bodell Construction. The 
modified benefit of the bargain calculation was based on the rate earned by Bodell 
Construction in making other hard money loans. Although some additional discovery 
was required regarding the modified benefit of the bargain theory, Bodell Construction 
agreed to produce any relevant documents and Appellees were informed that they could 
ask Mr. Weight, the person most knowledgeable regarding the facts relating to this 
theory, about these loans during his expert deposition, which was still to be conducted. 
With four months remaining before trial and ample opportunity to conduct any additional 
discovery, there was no prejudice to Appellees.15 Accordingly, the district court's 
decision to strike Bodell Construction's expert report was an abuse of discretion and 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the District Court's order granting summary judgment as well as its order striking 
the Weight Report. 
Moreover, whatever prejudice Appellees might have suffered no longer exists 
following the district court's grant of summary judgment. On remand Bodell 
Construction will consent to allow Appellees adequate time to conduct whatever other 
discovery they believe is necessary before the trial of this matter. 
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DATED this 22nd day of August, 2008. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Matthew R. Lewis 
Erin Bergeson Hull 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order from Supreme Court dates June 27, 2008 
993771 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 2 7 2008 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ooOoo 
Bodell Construction Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Mark H. Robbins; Cherokee & 
Walker Investment Company, LLC; 
Cherokee and Walker, LLC; Bank 
One, Utah; and Does 1 through 50, 
Case No. 20070951-SC 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER 
On December 7, 2007, this court transferred the above-
referenced case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the transfer order is vacated and 
the appeal is recalled. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all future filings be made in the 
Supreme Court. 
For The Court: 
:ed 7 I C h r i s t i n e M. Durtiam 
Chie f J u s t i c e 
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